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Abstract
Modal realists face a puzzle. For modal realism to be justified, modal realists
need to be able to give a successful reduction of modality. A simple argument,
however, appears to show that the reduction they propose fails. In order to
defend the claim that modal realism is justified, modal realists therefore need
to either show that this argument fails, or show that modal realists can give
another reduction of modality that is successful. I argue that modal realists
cannot do either of these things and that, as a result, modal realism is unjustified
and should be rejected.
1. The puzzle
Modal realists hold that there are multiple possible worlds and that possi-
ble worlds are certain concrete entities, such as spatiotemporally isolated uni-
verses.1 They also hold that we and all our surroundings are part of one and
only one of these worlds, a world which we might call ‘α’. Modal realism
is opposed to both abstractionist realism and eliminativism about possible
worlds. Abstractionist realism about possible worlds (or abstractionism, for
short) holds that there is at least one possible world and that possible worlds are
abstract entities, such as sets, properties or states of affairs. Eliminativism about
possible worlds, on the other hand, holds that there are no possible worlds, or,
if there are possible worlds, there is only one possible world and it is the world
we live in. Modal realists hold that, for any way a possible world might be, there
is a possible world that is that way. As a result, they hold that there are possible
1 Lewis (1986, Sect. 1.7) has forcefully argued that ‘concrete’ is ambiguous (although
he also held that possible worlds are concrete according to modal realism on all of
the disambiguations of ‘concrete’). To avoid such ambiguity, I will take an abstract
object to be something that is either a set, number, state of affairs, property, relation,
operator, quantifier, proposition or expression type (where operators and quantifiers
are the entities expressed by operator expressions and quantifier expressions, rather
than the expressions themselves), and I will take a concrete object to be something
that is not abstract. For simplicity, I am ignoring versions of modal realism that, like
the version formulated in McDaniel (2004), allow concreta to be wholly located at
multiple worlds or require that concreta only have properties like being a blue swan
relative to worlds and not simpliciter. The puzzle posed for modal realism in this
paper also applies to these other versions of modal realism.
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worlds containing such things as blue swans, talking donkeys and flying pigs.
They also endorse some form of recombination principle such as (RP).2
RP. For any individuals x and y, for any numbers m and n, provided there is a
spacetime that can fit them, there is a possible world containing m dupli-
cates of x and n duplicates of y.
Modal realists claim that we are justified in believing that there are multiple
possible worlds because their postulation can do important theoretical work.3
For example, modal realists claim that the postulation of possible worlds en-
ables a reduction in the number of notions needed to be taken as fundamental
by enabling possible-worlds analyses of notions which would otherwise need
to be taken as fundamental.4 The postulation of possible worlds, according to
2 An individual will be taken to be an entity that does not have a non-empty set
as a part. This definition of ‘individual’ is coextensive with Lewis’s definition in
Lewis (1991), given his views expounded there. (Note that Lewis [1991] identifies
the empty set with the mereological fusion of all individuals.) See (Lewis 1986, pp.
89–90) for Lewis’s discussion of the recombination principle.
3 While the orthodox view is that modal realism can be justified only on abductive
grounds that appeal to parsimony and explanatory power, Bricker has expressed the
hope that modal realism can justified on non-abductive grounds by being supported
by general metaphysical principles that “we can just see, on reflection” to be true
using a “Cartesian faculty of rational insight” (Bricker 2008, p. 119), and he has
sketched such grounds in (Bricker 2006, Sect. 2). Due to lack of space, the existence
of a Bricker-type justification for modal realism cannot be evaluated here and I will
assume the orthodox view that no such justification can be given. An argument in
the vicinity of the kind of argument Bricker has in mind, however, is discussed (and
rejected) in section 2 when I discuss the third kind of response to the contingency
objection to QR modal realism.
4 Some notions are intuitively simpler than other notions. For example, the property
of being a cube and the property of being red are both intuitively simpler than the
property of being a red cube. A fundamental notion (as I am using ‘fundamental’)
is a notion that is completely simple, where a notion (or aspect of reality) is either
a state of affairs, property, relation, operator or quantifier. (A fundamental notion
is a perfectly natural notion in Lewis’s terminology given the dominant use of that
terminology in Lewis [1986], with this notion being extended to apply to operators
and quantifiers as in Sider [2011]. See [Marshall 2012, Sect. 2–3] for discussion of
Lewis’s different uses of ‘perfectly natural’.) Fundamentality, so understood, needs
to be distinguished from mereological simplicity (which is the property of having no
proper parts), the notion of being a foundational fact (which is the notion of being
an explanatorily non-trivial fact that is not grounded or otherwise explained by some
other fact), and the notion of being a constituent of a foundational fact.
modal realists, can therefore increase the ideological parsimony of one’s over-
all theory, where the ideological parsimony of a theory is roughly a measure of
how few notions are taken as fundamental by the theory.5 Modal realists also
claim that the postulation of possible worlds vindicates a number of explanato-
rily powerful theories, such as our best psychological, semantical and physical
theories.6 They further claim that modal realism is superior to abstractionism,
since, while the postulation of concrete possible worlds can do all the impor-
tant work the postulation of abstract possible worlds can do, there is important
work the postulation of concrete possible worlds can do that the postulation of
abstract possible worlds cannot do. In particular, they claim that modal realists
can, while abstractionists cannot, give a reduction of modality.7
A reduction of modality is roughly an account that shows that there are no
irreducibly modal states of affairs, where a state of affairs is a way things are
or a way things fail to be, and where an irreducibly modal state of affairs is a
5 This characterisation of ideological parsimony is only rough, since nominalist the-
ories — theories that hold that there are no abstract objects — can differ in their
degree of ideological parsimony, despite the fact that they all hold that there are
no notions (since notions are abstract entities), and hence no fundamental notions.
The characterisation also assumes logical atomism, which is the thesis that every no-
tion can be fully analysed in terms of fundamental notions. For simplicity, I assume
logical atomism in this paper.
6 See (Lewis 1986, Ch. 1) for how realist theories of possible worlds can vindicate
psychological and semantical theories. The postulation of possible worlds can vin-
dicate the commitment to possible states in statistical physics by identifying these
states with either possible worlds or sets of possible worlds.
7 Modal realists have also claimed that modal realism has further advantages over
abstractionism. In particular, they have claimed that: a) abstractionist theories are
unable to represent all of the possibilities that they need to represent (Lewis 1986,
Sect 3.2), b) abstractionist theories have mysterious and metaphysically problem-
atic primitives (Lewis 1986, Sect. 3.4), and c) abstractionists need to take property-
theoretic notions as fundamental that modal realists can offer set-theoretic reduc-
tions of. I will assume here that abstractionists can overcome the problems posed
by (a) and (b), and that any advantage in ideological parsimony modal realists en-
joy regarding property-theoretic notions is offset by abstractionists being able to
provide property-theoretic reductions of set-theoretic notions, or is outweighed by
the loss in ideological parsimony suffered by modal realists who endorse the no-
reduction response discussed in footnote 20 to the puzzle posed in this paper. While
it is widely held that abstractionists and eliminativists cannot give a successful re-
duction of modality, some philosophers have attempted to provide abstractionist- or
eliminativist-friendly modal reductions, such as Armstrong (1989) and Sider (2011).
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state of affairs that can be expressed by a modal statement that cannot also be
expressed by a non-modal statement.8 To give a more precise characterisation
of what a reduction of modality is, let ‘φ =df ψ’ abbreviate ‘For it to be the case
that φ is for it to be the case that ψ’. A reduction of modality can be understood
to be an account T such that, for any modal statement φ, there is a non-modal
statement ψ such that T entails pφ =df ψq.9 A theory can be said to enable
a reduction of modality iff a consistent completion of it entails a reduction of
modality.10
A successful reduction of modality is a reduction of modality that has no
serious negative epistemic features, such as being inconsistent, or being incon-
sistent with what is highly plausible. Everything else being equal, a theory that
enables a successful reduction of modality is more likely to be true, since: i)
everything else being equal, a consistent complete theory that entails a reduc-
tion of modality represents things as being simpler than a consistent complete
theory that does not contain a reduction of modality, ii) everything else being
equal, a consistent complete theory that represents things as being simpler is
more likely to be true than a consistent complete theory that represents things
as being more complicated, and iii) everything else being equal, a theory with
8 Cf. (Sider 2003, Sect. 2). ‘State of affairs’ (as I am using it) needs to be distinguished
from ‘proposition’, where a proposition is understood to be an object of an assertion
or a mental state such as a belief. For some philosophers, such as those that hold that
propositions are states of affairs under modes of presentation, these entities are not
identical to each other.
9 A statement is a sentence that either describes how things are or describes how
things aren’t. Every statement is therefore either true or false. A modal statement is
a statement containing at least one modal expression, while a non-modal statement
is a statement containing no modal expressions. The notion of entailment used here
is a priori entailment, where T a priori entails S iff an ideal reasoner can determine
the truth of p¬T or S q purely on the basis of non-abductive a priori reasoning. There
are stronger notions of modal reductionism than that described above. If modal re-
ductionism doesn’t enable a modal reduction in the sense used here, however, it will
not allow a reduction in any of these stronger senses either.
10 S is a completion of T iff S is a complete theory that entails T . The notions of consis-
tency and completeness used here are a priori consistency and a priori completeness.
T is a priori consistent iff T is not a priori inconsistent, and T is a priori inconsistent
iff an ideal reasoner can determine T to be false purely on the basis of non-abductive
a priori reasoning. T is complete iff, for any statement S , either T a priori entails S ,
T a priori entails p¬S q.
more likely consistent completions is more likely to be true. That a theory en-
ables a successful reduction of modality is therefore a point in favour of the
theory.
Given φ and ψ both express states of affairs, it is at least prima facie plau-
sible that pφ =df ψq is true iff φ and ψ describe things as being the same way,
which is the case iff φ and ψ express the same states of affairs. In this paper, I
assume that this account of ‘=df’ is true, that there are states of affairs (as well
as other abstracta), and that modal realists also endorse this account of ‘=df’
and hold that there are states of affairs (as well as other abstracta).11 Given
this assumption, modal realists hold that their theory enables an account that
reveals how any state of affairs that can be expressed by a modal statement can
also be expressed by a non-modal statement, thereby revealing how there are
no irreducibly modal states of affairs.
David Lewis, the most famous modal realist, argued that modal realism
enables a reduction of modality by attempting to sketch a reduction of modality
enabled by modal realism. One component of the reduction Lewis sketched
concerns the modal predicate ‘is a possible world’. Say that x is an L-world
iff x is a maximally spatiotemporally interrelated individual: that is, iff x is an
individual such that i) any two parts of x are spatiotemporally related to each
other, and ii) anything that is spatiotemporally related to any part of x is itself
part of x. According to Lewis’s reduction, ‘is a possible world’ has analysis
(W).12
11 Given this account, ‘=df’ is symmetric, so that, given Phosphorus is a planet =df
Hesperus is a planet, Hesperus is a planet =df Phosphorus is a planet. Rosen has
argued against this account of ‘=df’ and put forward an alternative account on which
‘=df’ is irreflexive and ‘φ =df ψ’ entails ‘the state of affairs that ψ grounds the
state of affairs that φ’. (See Rosen [2010] and Rosen [MS].) The simpler account
of ‘=df’ assumed here can be replaced with Rosen’s account given relatively minor
changes. For example, while the existence of analyses might not contribute to a
reduction in the number of fundamental aspects of reality given Rosen’s account of
‘=df’, they still contribute to an increase in overall simplicity by contributing to a
reduction in the number of foundational facts. For a defence of the simpler account
of ‘pφ =df ψq’, see Dorr (MSb).
12 This is a simplification of Lewis’s official account of ‘possible world’ in (Lewis
1986, Sect 1.6). Lewis’s official account seems to be given by (A) and (B), where a
particular is an entity that is not a property, and Lewis describes what he takes to be
a system of relations that are analogous to spatiotemporal relations in (Lewis 1986,
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W. x is a possible world =df x is an L-world.
Since ‘L-world’ is a non-modal expression, it follows that, according to Lewis’s
reduction, any state of affairs expressed by a statement of the form ‘a is a
possible world’ can also be expressed by a non-modal statement of the form ‘a
is an L-world’.
A second component of Lewis’s sketched reduction concerns the modal
expressions ‘^’ and ‘’, where ‘^’ symbolises ‘it is absolutely possible that’
and ‘’ symbolises ‘it is absolutely necessary that’.13 Let ‘W’ symbolise ‘is
an L-world’, ‘B’ symbolise ‘is a blue swan’, ‘I’ symbolise ‘is part of’, and
‘∃’ express the unrestricted existential quantifier. According to Lewis’s pro-
pp. 75–6).
A. x is a possible individual =df i) x is an individual, and ii) there is a system S of
relations that are analogous to the system of spatiotemporal relations such that,
for any particulars y and z that are part of x and wholly distinct from each other,
y is related to z by S .
B. x is a possible world =df x is a possible individual that is not a proper part of
any possible individual.
An arguably superior modal realist account of ‘possible world’ is given in Bricker
(1996; 2008). The precise details of how a modal realist defines ‘possible world’ are
not important for the purposes of this paper.
(W) is (roughly) Lewis’s reduction of ‘possible world’ given he employs the no-
tion of reduction described above. While it is arguably consistent with the textual
evidence to interpret Lewis as employing such a notion of reduction, he does not
clearly articulate what kind of reduction he is attempting to give in Lewis (1986)
and elsewhere. If one thinks that Lewis did not employ this notion of reduction, one
may take the above to be a Lewis-style reduction rather than Lewis’s actual reduc-
tion. (W) should be regarded as being implicitly pre-fixed with ‘∀x’. An analysis
of a one-place predicate F is a statement of the form p∀x(Fx =df φ)q. An anal-
ysis of a statement S is a statement of the form pS =df Tq.
13 The absolute notions of possibility and necessity need to be distinguished from epis-
temic and deontic notions of possibility and necessity, such as those expressed by
‘For all I know it might be that’ and ‘It is morally permissible to make it the case
that’. They also need to be distinguished from relative notions of (non-epistemic and
non-deontic) possibility and necessity, such as nomological possibility and necessity
and technological possibility and necessity. The relative notions of possibility and
necessity can plausibly be defined in terms of absolute possibility and necessity. For
example, nomological possibility can be analysed as follows: It is nomologically
possible that ϕ =df it is absolutely possible that ϕ and the actual laws obtain.
posed reduction, at least on its most obvious interpretation, the modal state-
ments ‘^∃Bx’ and ‘∃Bx’ have analyses (^B) and (B).14
^B. ^∃xBx =df ∃u∃x(Wu∧ Ixu∧ Bx).
B. ∃xBx =df ∀u(Wu ⊃ ∃x(Ixu∧ Bx)).
Since the right-hand sides of (^B) and (B) contain only non-modal expres-
sions, the states of affairs expressed by the modal statements ‘^∃xBx’ and
‘∃xBx’ can therefore also be expressed by non-modal statements according
to Lewis’s reduction.
The argument modal realists give for modal realism can now be stated as
follows: (I) The best completions of realism about possible worlds are better
(on either its modal realist or abstractionist varieties) than the best completions
of eliminativism about possible worlds, since the best completions of realism
about possible worlds are more ideologically parsimonious than the best com-
pletions of eliminativism about possible worlds, and since the best completions
of realism about possible worlds, unlike the best completions of eliminativism
about possible worlds, vindicate the truth of our best theories of psychology,
semantics and physics. (II) The best completions of modal realism are better
than the best completions of abstractionism, since a) the best completions of
modal realism contain Lewis’s reduction of modality while the best comple-
tions of abstractionism do not contain any reduction of modality, and since b)
there are no important respects in which the best completions of modal realism
are worse than the best completions of abstractionism. It follows from (I) that
realism about possible worlds is justified, and it follows from the combination
of (I) and (II) that modal realism is justified.15
Unfortunately for modal realism, there is good reason to think that Lewis’s
reduction of modality is not successful, and hence good reason to think that
(II) is false and that the above argument for modal realism fails. In particular,
14 ‘∧’ expresses conjunction, and ‘⊃’ expresses the material conditional. An alternative
interpretation of Lewis’s account of possibility and necessity is discussed in footnote
42.
15 This argument has to be supplemented by the premise that modal realist, abstraction-
ist and eliminativist theories exhaust the credible theories of possible worlds.
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a simple argument shows that Lewis’s reduction is false, given the uncontro-
versial empirical claim that there are no blue swans in α, and given the highly
plausible modal theses and schemas (-a), (NPB), (K) and (Nec).16
-a. If φ =df ψ, then (φ ≡ ψ).
NPB. ^∃xBx.
K. If (φ ≡ ψ) and φ, then ψ.
Nec. If (φ) and ‘ψ’ is a logical consequence of ‘φ’, then (ψ).
The argument is the following: Suppose for reductio that Lewis’s reduction of
modality is true, and hence that (^B) and (B) are both true. (1) then follows
from (^B) and (-a).
1. (^∃xBx ≡ ∃u∃x(Wu∧ Ixu∧ Bx)).
(2) follows from (1), (NPB) and (K).
2. ∃u∃x(Wu∧ Ixu∧ Bx).
Since ‘∃xBx’ is a logical consequence of ‘∃u∃x(Wu∧ Ixu∧ Bx)’, (3) follows
from (2) and (Nec).
3. ∃xBx.
Lewis’s reduction of modality therefore entails that it is necessary that there is
a blue swan. This, by itself, may seem like a strong reason to reject Lewis’s
reduction. His reduction, however, has a further consequence that is arguably
even more unacceptable. (4) follows from (3) and (B).
16 (-a) may need to be restricted so that φ and ψ do not contain rigidification devices
such as ‘actually’.‘≡’ symbolises material equivalence. By ‘logical consequence’
I mean logical consequence with respect to classical predicate logic. If someone
thinks that we do not have strong grounds for thinking that there are no blue swans
in α, then they can replace ‘B’ throughout with some suitable predicate F for which
they think we do have strong grounds for believing that, while p^∃xFxq is true, F
applies to nothing in α, such as, for example, the predicate ‘is a solid uranium sphere
with a diameter of one trillion kilometers’.
4. ∀u(Wu ⊃ ∃x(Ixu∧ Bx)).
(4), however, is false, since there are no blue swans in α. Hence, by reductio, it
follows that Lewis’s reduction of modality is false.
(K) and (Nec) both appear to be obviously true. (NPB) is also highly
plausible, since it is hard to see how things could be such that, if things were
that way, it would be impossible for there to be a blue swan.17 Finally, (-a) is
also highly plausible. (-a) is arguably presupposed by the widespread practice
in philosophy of evaluating proposed analyses by considering possible cases
17 For a modal realist to successfully respond to the above argument against Lewis’s
reduction by rejecting (NPB), she would need to both: i) describe conditions which
are credibly such that, had those conditions obtained, it would have been impossible
for there to be a blue swan, and ii) accomplish (i) in a way that does not allow
a successful reformulated version of the argument against Lewis’s reduction. To
illustrate the difficulty of (ii), suppose a modal realist accomplishes (i) by endorsing
(C) and claiming that, due to (C), it would have been impossible for there to be a
blue swan had it been the case that there were no blue things and no swans.
C. (^∃xBx ≡ ∃x∃y(x is blue ∧ y is a swan)).
Given the natural extension of Lewis’s reduction to ‘(∃x∃y(x is blue and y is a
swan) ⊃ ∃xBx)’ given by (BS ), such a modal realist would then face the following
reformulated version of the argument against Lewis’s reduction, whose premises are
(C), (K#) (which is just as plausible as (K)), (Nec), (-a) and the fact that, while
there are swans and blue things in α, there are no blue swans in α.
BS . (∃x∃y(x is blue and y is a swan) ⊃ ∃xBx) =df ∀u(Wu ⊃ (∃x∃y(Ixu ∧ Iyu ∧
x is blue∧ y is a swan) ⊃ ∃x(Ixu∧ Bx))).
K#. If (ϕ ≡ φ) and (ϕ ≡ ψ), then (φ ≡ ψ).
The reformulated argument is the following: Suppose, for reductio, that Lewis’s
reduction is true, and hence that (^B) and (BS ) are both true. It follows from
(^B) and (-a) that: a) (^∃xBx ≡ ∃u∃x(Wu ∧ Ixu ∧ Bx)). It follows from
(a), (C) and (K#) that: b) (∃x∃y(x is blue ∧ y is swan) ≡ ∃u∃x(Wu ∧ Ixu ∧
Bx)). Since ‘∃x∃y(x is blue ∧ y is swan) ⊃ ∃xBx’ is a logical consequence of
‘∃x∃y(x is blue ∧ y is swan) ≡ ∃u∃x(Wu ∧ Ixu ∧ Bx)’, it then follows from (b)
and (Nec) that: c) (∃x∃y(x is blue ∧ y is a swan) ⊃ ∃xBx). It then follows from
(c) and (BS ) that: d) ∀u(Wu ⊃ (∃x∃y(Ixu ∧ Iyu ∧ x is blue ∧ y is a swan) ⊃
∃x(Ixu ∧ Bx))). (d), however, is false, since it falsely entails that there is a blue
swan in α, given the fact that there are blue things and swans in α. Hence, by reduc-
tio, Lewis’s reduction fails.
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rather than only actual cases. It is widely taken to be true, for example, that,
if it is possible for John to justifiably truly believe that snow is white without
knowing that snow is white, then the following analysis is false: For it to be
the case that John knows that snow is white is for it to be the case that John
justifiably truly believes that snow is white. A powerful argument for (-a) is
the following: If ‘φ’ and ‘ψ’ represent things as being the same, which they
do if φ =df ψ, then things couldn’t be as ‘φ’ represents them as being unless
they were also how ‘ψ’ represents them as being, and things couldn’t be as
‘ψ’ represents them as being unless they were also how ‘φ’ represents them as
being. Hence, if φ =df ψ, then (φ ≡ ψ). Hence (-a) is valid.18
Modal realism therefore faces the following problem: In order to be justi-
fied, modal realists need to be able to give a successful reduction of modality.
The above argument, however, appears to show that the reduction modal real-
ists propose is not successful. In order to defend the claim that modal realism is
justified, modal realists therefore need to either show that the above argument
fails or show that modal realists can give an alternative reduction of modality
that is successful. It is not clear, however, whether modal realists can do either
of these things.
Call this problem the puzzle, and call the above argument against Lewis’s
reduction of modality the puzzle argument.19 In section 2, I will first formulate
18 This argument can be more precisely formulated so that its premises are the in-
stances of the schemas: i) If χ =df ζ, then ‘χ ≡ ζ’ represents things as being such
that ζ ≡ ζ; ii) (ζ ≡ ζ); and iii) If ‘χ’ represents things as being such that ζ, and
ζ, then χ. Suppose pφ =df ψq is true for some sentences φ and ψ. It then follows
from (i) that p‘φ ≡ ψ’ represents things as being such that ψ ≡ ψq is true. Since, by
(ii), p(ψ ≡ ψ)q is true, it then follows from (iii) that p(φ ≡ ψ)q is true. Hence, pIf
φ =df ψ, then (φ ≡ ψ)q is true, just as (-a) claims.
19 Other papers that discuss puzzles in the vicinity of the puzzle posed here for modal
realism are Parsons (2012) (a draft of which was first put on his website in 2005),
Dorr (MSa), Noonan (2014), Divers (2014) and Jago (MS). Parsons (2012) was
prompted by a discussion about the present paper, while Divers (2014) is a response
to Noonan (2014). Dorr and Noonan in effect defend versions of the QR response
discussed in section 2, while Divers defends a version of the ambiguity response
discussed in section 3. Parsons rejects the need for modal realism to enable a reduc-
tion of modality but does not explain how modal realism is meant to be justified in
the absence of such a reduction. (See footnote 20 for further discussion of this kind
of response.) Jago (MS) criticises a number of modal realist attempts to provide a
reduction of modality.
what I take to be the best response to the puzzle available to modal realists,
which involves replacing Lewis’s reduction of modality with an alternative re-
duction, before arguing that this response fails. In sections 3 and 4, I will then
discuss two other responses to the puzzle, the first of which claims that ‘’ and
‘^’ are ambiguous, and the second of which claims that modal realists should
be eliminativists about modality. I will argue that both these responses also fail.
On the basis of these failures, I will conclude that modal realism is not justified
and should be rejected.20
Divers (1999) discusses the following distinct, though related, problem for Lewis’s
reduction: It is natural to extend Lewis’s account of modality so that it endorses
(^W).
^W. ^∃x∃y((x , y) ∧Wx ∧Wy) =df ∃u∃x∃y(Wu ∧ Ixu ∧ Iyu ∧ (x , y) ∧Wx ∧
Wy).
Since no L-world contains two L-worlds, it follows from (^W) that ‘^∃x∃y((x ,
y)∧Wx∧Wy)’ is false. Given the highly plausible principle (T), however, it follows
from this that ‘∃x∃y((x , y) ∧Wx∧Wy)’ is also false, which conflicts with modal
realism.
T. φ ⊃ ^φ.
Lewis’s account can be modified so that it avoids Divers’s problem by replacing ‘W’
with ‘W#’, which symbolises ‘is a fusion of L-worlds’. This modification, however,
does not avoid the puzzle argument. Another response to Divers’s problem has in ef-
fect been suggested by (Hudson 1997, Sect. 2) who claims that modal realists should
reject (T) and hold that some true propositions are necessary falsehoods (though no
actually true propositions are necessary falsehoods).
20 Another response a modal realist might adopt, which might be called the no-
reduction response, is to deny that modal realists need to give a reduction of modality
in order to be justified. Such a modal realist might accept the premises of the puzzle
argument ((K), (Nec), (-a), (NPB) and ‘There are no blue swans in α’), reject
(^B) and (B), and instead endorse a modification of (B) and (^B) that replaces
‘=df’ with the material biconditional ‘≡’ (and replaces ‘W’ with ‘W#’ as suggested
in footnote 19 to avoid Divers’ problem). Such a modal realist can also reject modal
claims like ‘∃xBx’, the commitment to which raises significant problems for the
responses discussed in section 2 and 3. As made clear above, one serious problem
with this response is that a modal realist who adopts it loses the key advantage modal
realism is meant to have over its rivals: that of enabling a reduction of modality. A
modal realist who adopts this response also loses a great number of other advantages
modal realism is widely thought to share with abstractionist theories over elimina-
tivism about possible worlds, such as being able to analyse counterfactuality, modal
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Before discussing these responses, it is important to appreciate that the puz-
zle argument does not apply to all attempts to analyse modality in terms of
possible worlds. One account the argument does not apply to, for example, is
comparativity and supervenience in terms of (at most) a single modal notion. Given
these deficiencies, the no-reduction response is very unappealing.
The difficulty no-reduction modal realists have in providing analyses of modal no-
tions can be illustrated by seeing how modal realists who adopt the no-reduction
response are unable to endorse Lewis’s analysis of counterfactuality. According to
Lewis’s account of counterfactuals, the counterfactual operator expression ‘Were
it the case that . . . then it would be the case that’ expresses different counterfac-
tual operators in different contexts, each corresponding to a different comparative
similarity relation. Let ‘’ express one of these counterfactual operators, let ‘’
express its corresponding comparative similarity relation, and let ‘x z y’ symbol-
ise ‘x is at least as similar to z as y is’ under this comparative similarity relation.
When suitably disambiguated, and when restricted to the case where ‘φ’ and ‘ψ’
are non-modal statements expressing qualitative states of affairs, Lewis’s account of
‘φ ψ’ (modified in order to accord with the modification made to (^B) and (B)
above) is given by (), where ‘at’ restricts all implicit and explicit quantification
within its scope to parts of (the referent of) ‘u’. (For ‘qualitative’ see footnote 27,
and for Lewis’s analysis of counterfactuality see [Lewis 1973b, pp. 48–9].)
. φ ψ =df ¬∃u(W#u ∧ (at u, φ)) ∨ ∃u[W#u ∧ (at u, φ) ∧ ∀v[(W#v ∧ (v α u))
⊃ (at v, φ ⊃ ψ)]].
Let ‘T ’ symbolise ‘is a four-sided triangle’. Given (-a), (Nec), (K) and
p¬(∃xBx  ∃xT x)q, it can be shown that () entails p∃xBxq. The proof
is the following: (1) follows from () and (-a).
1. [(∃zBz  ∃zTz) ≡ [¬∃u(W#u ∧ (at u, ∃zBz)) ∨ ∃u[W#u ∧ (at u, ∃zBz) ∧
∀v[(W#v ∧ (v α u)) ⊃ (at v, ∃zBz ⊃ ∃zTz)]]]]q.
Since p¬φ ≡ ¬ψq is a logical consequence of pφ ≡ ψq, p(¬φ ≡ ¬ψ)q follows
from p(φ ≡ ψ)q and (Nec). Hence (2) follows from (1), (Nec), (K) and
p¬(∃xBx ∃xT x)q.
2. ¬[¬∃u(W#u ∧ (at u, ∃zBz)) ∨ ∃u[W#u ∧ (at u, ∃zBz) ∧ ∀v[(W#v ∧ (v α u))
⊃ (at v, ∃zBz ⊃ ∃zTz)]]].
p∃xBxq follows from (2) and (Nec), since, given the definition of ‘at’, ‘∃xBx’
is a logical consequence of ‘¬[¬∃u(W#u ∧ (at u, ∃zBz)) ∨ ∃u[W#u ∧ (at u, ∃zBz) ∧
∀v[((W#v ∧ (v α u)) ⊃ (at v, ∃zBz ⊃ ∃zTz)]]]’. Since no-reduction modal realists
reject p∃xBxq; accept (-a), (Nec) and (K); and should accept p¬(∃xBx 
∃xT x)q, they must therefore reject ().
the abstractionist account of Alvin Plantinga. According to Plantinga, possible
worlds are states of affairs of a certain type, where for Plantinga states of af-
fairs are abstract necessarily existing entities. For any states of affairs s and s∗,
we have the following definitions: i) s includes s∗ iff it is not possible that (s
obtains and s∗ does not obtain); ii) s precludes s∗ iff it is not possible that (s
obtains and s∗ obtains); iii) s is maximal iff, for any state of affairs s∗, either
s includes s∗ or s precludes s∗; and iv) s is possible iff it is possible that s
obtains. Let ‘WP’ symbolise ‘is a maximal possible state of affairs’ and ‘O’
symbolise ‘obtains’. Plantinga, in effect, endorses (^PB) and (PB), together
with the claim that ‘is a possible world’ expresses the same property as ‘is a
maximal possible state of affairs’.
^PB. ^∃xBx =df ∃u[WPu∧ (Ou ⊃ ∃xBx)].
PB. ∃xBx =df ∀u[WPu ⊃ (Ou ⊃ ∃xBx)].
If we attempt to apply the puzzle argument to Plantinga’s account, we can
derive analogues of the first two lines of the argument by first deriving (1P)
from Plantinga’s account and (-a), and then deriving (2P) from (1P), (NPB)
and (K).
1P. (^∃xBx ≡ ∃u(WPu∧ (Oy ⊃ ∃xBx))).
2P. ∃u(WPu∧ (Ou ⊃ ∃xBx)).
Unlike in the argument against Lewis’s reduction, however, it is not possible
to derive ‘∃xBx’ from (2P) using (Nec) or any other uncontroversial premise.
The puzzle argument therefore does not threaten Plantinga’s account of modal-
ity.21
21 While the puzzle argument does not pose a problem for Plantinga’s account, it does
pose a problem for certain other abstractionist accounts of possible worlds. In partic-
ular, it poses a problem for abstractionist accounts that, unlike Plantinga’s account,
hold that possible worlds exist merely contingently. To see why, consider an account
of modality that is the same as Plantinga’s except for holding that each possible
world only contingently exists. On such an account, we can still derive (2P). How-
ever, (2P) is presumably false on such an account, since, if each possible world exists
only contingently, it is presumably not necessary that there be a possible world such
that, necessarily, had it obtained, there would have been a blue swan. The account
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In addition to appreciating that the puzzle argument does not threaten all
possible-worlds analyses of modality, it is also important to appreciate that the
puzzle has a significance that goes beyond the philosophy of possible worlds.
In particular, it is important to appreciate that the puzzle also applies to the
highly popular temporal analogue of modal realism, four-dimensionalism.22
According to four-dimensionalists, times are three-dimensional slices of a four-
dimensional object called spacetime. Let ‘S ’ symbolise ‘It either was, is or
will be the case that’, ‘A’ symbolise ‘It has always been and will always be
the case that’, ‘D’ symbolise ‘is a dinosaur’, and ‘T ’ symbolise ‘is a complete
time slice’. Four-dimensionalists typically endorse the analyses (SD) and (AD),
which are temporal analogues of (^B) and (B).
SD. S∃xDx =df ∃u∃x(Tu∧ Ixu∧ Dx).
AD. A∃xDx =df ∀u(Tu ⊃ ∃x(Ixu∧ Dx)).
An analogue of the puzzle argument, however, shows that the combination of
(AD) and (SD) fails, given the highly plausible (A-a), (ASD), (AK) and (Alw)
(which are the temporal analogues of (-a), (NPB), (K) and (Nec)), and the
empirical fact that there is no dinosaur located in t∗ (where t∗ is the time slice
we are currently located at according to the four-dimensionalists).23
A-a. If φ =df ψ, then A(φ ≡ ψ).
ASD. AS∃xDx.
AK. If A(φ ≡ ψ) and Aφ, then Aψ.
therefore conflicts with the same highly plausible modal principles that Lewis’s re-
duction conflicts with.
22 The puzzle also applies to (eternalist) three-dimensionalism, as well as to the
modal analogue of (eternalist) three-dimensionalism. See (Sider 2001, Ch. 3) for
three-dimensionalism, and see McDaniel (2004) for the modal analogue of three-
dimensionalism.
23 The analogue argument is obtained from the original puzzle argument by replacing
‘^’ with ‘S ’, ‘’ with ‘A’, ‘B’ with ‘D’, ‘α’ with ‘t∗’, (K) with (AK), (Nec) with
(Alw), (-a) with (A-a), and (NPB) with (ASD). As in the case of (-a), (A-a) may
need to be restricted so that φ and ψ do not contain rigidification devices such as
‘now’ and ‘presently’.
Alw. If Aφ and ‘ψ’ is a logical consequence of ‘φ’, then Aψ.
Due to limitations of space, I will focus on the puzzle facing modal realism,
rather than the analogous puzzle facing four-dimensionalism. It is important to
keep in mind the temporal analogue of the puzzle facing modal realism, how-
ever, since modal realists and four-dimensionalists have analogous responses
available to them to these puzzles and these responses face analogous problems.
If, as I will argue here, modal realists cannot adequately respond to the puzzle
facing them, there is therefore reason to suspect that four-dimensionalists can-
not adequately respond to the puzzle facing them either.
2. The quantifier restriction response
A natural way for a modal realist to respond to the puzzle described in sec-
tion 1 is to accept the premises of the puzzle argument (namely (K), (Nec),
(-a), (NPB) and ‘There are no blue swans in α’), accept the conclusion of
the puzzle argument (that Lewis’s reduction of modality is false), and seek an
alternative reduction of modality that avoids the puzzle argument. A natural
attempt at providing such an alternative reduction is to replace the unrestricted
quantifier expression ‘∃x’ on the left-hand sides of (^B) and (B) with the
restricted quantifier expression ‘(∃x|Ixα)’, where ‘(∃x|Ixα)’ symbolises ‘for
some x such that x is part of α’.24 According to this response, which we may
call the quantifier restriction response (or the QR response, for short), while at
least one of (^B) and (B) is false, (^∗B) and (∗B) are both true.
^∗B. ^(∃x|Ixα)Bx =df ∃u∃x(Wu∧ Ixu∧ Bx).
∗B. (∃x|Ixα)Bx =df ∀u(Wu ⊃ ∃x(Ixu∧ Bx)).
Given (^∗B), it is not the state of affairs of there possibly being a blue swan, but
instead the state of affairs of there possibly being a blue swan that is part of α,
that is identical to the state of affairs of there being an L-world containing a blue
swan. Similarly, given (∗B), it is not the state of affairs of there necessarily
being a blue swan, but instead the state of affairs of there necessarily being a
24 More generally, ‘(∃x|Fx)’ symbolises ‘For some x such that Fx’. Any statement of
the form ‘(∃x|Fx)Gx’ is necessarily equivalent to ‘∃x(Fx ∧Gx)’.
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blue swan that is part of α, that is identical to the state of affairs that every
L-world contains a blue swan.
The combination of (^∗B) and (∗B) does not fall victim to any variant
of the puzzle argument. To see why, suppose we accept (NPB∗), which is an
analogue of (NPB).
NPB∗. ^(∃x|Ixα)Bx.
We can derive (1∗) from (^∗B) and (-a); then derive (2∗) from (1∗), (NPB∗)
and (K); and then derive (3∗) from (2∗) and (Nec).
1∗. (^(∃x|Ixα)Bx ≡ ∃u∃x(Wu∧ Ixu∧ Bx)).
2∗. ∃u∃x(Wu∧ Ixu∧ Bx).
3∗. ∃xBx.
However, we cannot use (∗B) to derive from (3∗) the false result that all L-
worlds contain a blue swan. The combination of (^∗B) and (∗B), then, unlike
the combination of (^B) and (B), does not entail that there is a blue swan in
α.
Call a modal realist who adopts this response to the puzzle a QR modal
realist, and call the account such a modal realist endorses by adopting this
response QR modal realism.25 Since a QR modal realist rejects the combina-
tion of (^B) and (B), she needs to give a new account of what non-modal
statements express the states of affairs expressed by ‘^∃xBx’ and ‘∃xBx’ in
order to provide a general reduction of modality. To determine what account
she should give, it is useful to note that (7) and (8) follow from (5), (6), (^∗B),
(∗B), (K), (Nec), (-a), (NPB) and (NPB∗).26
25 Dorr (MSa) and Noonan (2014) have also independently formulated versions of
QR modal realism. Both Dorr and Noonan think modal realists should endorse this
version of modal realism.
26 It was shown above that (3∗) follows from (^∗B), (-a), (NPB∗), (K) and (Nec).
Since (7) follows from (NPB), (3∗) and (6); (7) follows from (^∗B), (-a), (NPB∗),
(K), (Nec) and (6). Since ‘∃xBx’ follows from (3∗) and (5); and (8) follows
from ‘∃xBx’, (3∗) and (6); (8) follows from (^∗B), (-a), (NPB∗), (K), (Nec),
(5) and (6).
5. ∃xBx ⊃ ∃xBx.
6. (φ∧ ψ) ⊃ (φ ≡ ψ).
7. (^∃xBx ≡ ∃xBx).
8. (∃xBx ≡ ∃xBx).
Given a QR modal realist endorses (NPB∗), she should plausibly endorse (7)
and (8), since (5) and (6) are highly plausible, and since QR modal realists
accept (^∗B), (∗B), (K), (Nec), (-a) and (NPB). Given she endorses (7) and
(8), and hence holds that ‘^∃xBx’, ‘∃xBx’ and ‘∃xBx’ express necessarily
equivalent states of affairs, it is then natural for her to go further and claim that
they express the same state of affairs, and so endorse the analyses (Q^∗B) and
(Q∗B).
Q^∗B. ^∃xBx =df ∃xBx.
Q∗B. ∃xBx =df ∃xBx.
I will assume that QR modal realists do this.
In order to make it plausible that modal realism enables a reduction of
modality, a QR modal realist also needs to give a more general account of
which non-modal statements express the same states of affairs as which modal
statements than that provided by (^∗B), (∗B), (Q^∗B) and (Q∗B). (^∗B),
(∗B), (Q^∗B) and (Q∗B) suggest a picture of modality according to which
qualitative states of affairs, such as the state of affairs of there being a blue swan,
either necessarily obtain or necessarily fail to obtain, while non-qualitative
states of affairs, such as the state of affairs of there being a blue swan in α,
may contingently obtain or contingently fail to obtain.27 A natural generali-
27 In light of this, QR modal realism might instead be called worldly qualitative ne-
cessitarianism. A qualitative state of affairs is intuitively a state of affairs that does
not involve any particular things (though it might involve things in general), while
a non-qualitative state of affairs is intuitively a state of affairs that involves at least
one particular thing. A qualitative property or relation is similarly intuitively a prop-
erty or relation that does not involve any particular things, whereas a non-qualitative
property or relation is a property or relation that involves at least one particular thing.
Examples of qualitative properties include being a blue swan and being next to a tin,
while examples of non-qualitative properties include being identical to Obama and
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sation of (Q^∗B) and (Q∗B) that accords with this picture is given by the
schemas (Q^∗) and (Q∗), where φ can be replaced by any statement express-
ing a qualitative state of affairs.
Q^∗. ^φ =df φ.
Q∗. φ =df φ.
Natural generalisations of (^∗B) and (∗B) that accord with this picture, on the
other hand, can be obtained by appealing to some version of counterpart theory.
For example, a QR modal realist might adopt the simple version of counterpart
theory given by the schemas (^∗) and (∗).28
being an admirer of both Kripke and Joan of Arc.
28 According to standard versions of counterpart theory, co-referring names can be as-
sociated with different counterpart relations. This allows modal sentences differing
in only co-referring names to differ in truth value. The simple version of counterpart
theory described above faces serious problems in treating ‘actually’, as do the ver-
sions of counterpart theory put forward, for example, in Lewis (1968; 1971), Forbes
(1982; 1990), Ramachandran (1989) and Sider (MS). (For discussion, see Hazen
(1979) and Fara & Williamson (2005).) A (restricted) version of counterpart theory
that avoids these problems is the following: Define a counterpart relation to be any
precisification (in any context) of ‘is similar enough to’. Define a representational
function f to be a function that maps each counterpart relation to a permutation on
the set of individuals. Define Id∗ to be the function that maps each counterpart re-
lation to the identity function on the set of individuals. Say that a representational
function f is possible relative to a representational function f ′ iff, for any individu-
als x and y, for any counterpart relation c, [ f (c)](x) stands in c to [ f (c)](y). Define
L′ to be a first-order language containing ‘¬’, ‘∧’, ‘∃∗’ (symbolising ‘for some in-
dividual’), ‘Actually’, ‘^’, names of individuals, variables, and predicates express-
ing fundamental properties and relations. Suppose each of the names and variables
in L′ is associated with a counterpart relation, and let pC(t)q refer to the coun-
terpart relation associated with t. Define a two-place function expression ‘Trans’
(which takes as arguments terms referring to formulas in L′ in its first place and
terms referring to representational functions in its second place) so that it satisfies:
a) Trans(pF(t1, . . . tn)q, f ) = pF([ f (C(t1)]t1, . . . , [ f (C(tn)]tn)q; b) Trans(p¬φq,
f ) = p¬Trans(φ, f )q; c) Trans(pφ ∧ ψq, f ) = pTrans(φ, f ) ∧ Trans(ψ, f )q; d)
Trans(p∃∗vφq, f ) = p∃∗vTrans(φ, f )q; e) Trans(p^φq, f ) = p∃g(g is a representa-
tional function, g is possible relative to f , and Trans(φ, g)q; and f) Trans(pActually,
φq, f ) = Trans(φ, Id∗). The counterpart theoretic analysis of any formula φ in L′ is
then the formula Trans(φ, Id∗). This version of counterpart theory entails actualism,
where actualism is the thesis that, for any existing thing x, x actually exists. The ac-
count can be modified to be made compatible with Lewis’s non-actualist indexical
account of ‘actually’ outlined in (Lewis 1986, Sect. 1.9).
^∗. ^Fa1 . . . an =df ∃z1 . . .∃zn(Ca1z1a1 ∧ . . .∧Canznan ∧ Fz1 . . . zn).
∗. Fa1 . . . an =df ∀z1 . . .∀zn((Ca1z1a1 ∧ . . .∧Canznan) ⊃ Fz1 . . . zn).
In (^∗) and (∗), ‘F’ can be replaced by any n-place predicate that expresses
an n-place qualitative property or relation; ‘a1’,. . . ‘an’ can be replaced by any
names m1,. . .mn; ‘z1’,. . . ‘zn’ can be replaced by distinct variables v1,. . . vn
which are associated with the same counterpart relations as m1,. . .mn respec-
tively; and ‘Ca1 ’,. . . ‘Can ’ can be replaced with predicates expressing the coun-
terpart relations associated with m1,. . .mn respectively. (^∗) and (∗) can be
regarded as reducing to (Q^∗) and (Q∗) in the case where n = 0.29
The big problem with the QR response is that QR modal realism is incom-
patible with a large number of highly plausible modal propositions.30 For ex-
29 A QR modal realist who endorses (^∗) and (∗), and who also endorses (^∗B),
(∗B), (Q^∗B) and (Q∗B), needs to show that the former include the latter as spe-
cial cases, or at least that they are consistent with each other. Since ‘∃xBx’ expresses
a qualitative state of affairs, it is easy to see that (Q^∗B) and (Q∗B) are instances
of (Q^∗) and (Q∗). How (^∗B) and (∗B) relate to (^∗) and (∗), however, is
less straightforward to determine. Given ‘α’ is associated with a counterpart rela-
tion that necessarily relates each L-world to all and only the L-worlds, (^∗) and (∗)
entail that ‘^(∃x|Ixα)Bx’ is necessarily equivalent to ‘∃u∃x(Wu∧ Ixu ∧ Bx)’, and
that ‘(∃x|Ixα)Bx’ is necessarily equivalent to ‘∀u(Wu ⊃ ∃(Ixu ∧ Bx))’. Given
necessarily equivalent states of affairs are identical, (^∗B) and (∗B) are therefore
entailed by (^∗) and (∗). Given a more fine-grain theory of states of affairs accord-
ing to which necessarily equivalent states of affairs can be distinct from each other,
however, there is no reason to think that (^∗) and (∗) entail, or are even compati-
ble with, (^∗B) and (∗B). As a result, given a more fine-grain theory of states of
affairs, a QR modal realist should plausibly hold that (^∗B) and (∗B) are only ap-
proximately true, and should hold that it is the relevant instances of (^∗) and (∗)
that are strictly true. That is, instead of endorsing (^∗B) and (∗B), QR modal real-
ists should instead endorse (^∗Bα) and (∗Bα), where ‘Cα’ expresses a counterpart
relation that necessarily relates each L-world to all and only the L-worlds.
^∗Bα. ^(∃x|Ixα)Bx =df ∃u(Cαuα∧ ∃x(Ixu∧ Bx)).
∗Bα. (∃x|Ixα)Bx =df ∀u(Cαuα ⊃ ∃x(Ixu∧ Bx)).
30 Since L-worlds plausibly deserve to be called worlds (in at least one ordinary sense
of ‘world’), L-worlds plausibly deserve to be called possible worlds in the sense of
‘possible’ on which anything that is an F is a possible F. There is another sense of
‘possible world’, however, on which, given QR modal realism, L-worlds arguably do
not play enough of the required role to count as being possible worlds since they do
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ample, since QR modal realists hold that there is a blue swan, (Q∗) commits
them to (3).
3. ∃xBx. (Necessarily, there is a blue swan.)
(3), however, is highly implausible, since, even if there are blue swans as modal
realists claim, surely there might have been no such entities. The claim that it
is necessary that there is a blue swan somewhere in the pluriverse of L-worlds
(given there is in fact a blue swan in this pluriverse) is prima facie no more
plausible than the claim that it is necessary that there is an alien creature some-
where in our universe (given there is in fact an alien creature somewhere in our
universe). Even if there are alien creatures on some planet in our universe, it is
surely merely contingent that there are such creatures. Similarly, even if there
are blue swans in some L-world in the pluriverse, it is surely merely contingent
that there are such swans. Hence, it is highly plausible that, contra QR modal
realism, it is not necessary that there is a blue swan.
Since QR modal realists hold that there are multiple L-worlds, (Q∗) also
commits them to the truth of (9).
9. ∃x∃y((x , y) ∧ Wx ∧ Wy). (Necessarily, there are multiple L-
worlds.)
(9), however, is also highly implausible. While it is plausibly possible for there
to be multiple L-worlds, it is surely not necessary that there are such entities.
The claim that it is necessary that there are multiple L-worlds is prima facie no
more plausible than the claim that it is necessary that there are multiple planets
in our universe. Just as it is surely contingent whether our universe has more
not play the distinctive role of possible worlds in the QR modal realist analysis of
possibility and necessity. If QR modal realists are unable to identify possible worlds
(in this second sense) with L-worlds, however, it is not clear what entities in their
ontology they can identify them with, apart from perhaps the pluriverse itself. Given
it is this second sense on which modal realism holds that there are multiple possible
worlds, however, if QR modal realism is incompatible with there being multiple
such entities, then QR modal realists will have to reject modal realism. The best
response to this problem might be for QR modal realists to simply admit that their
view isn’t, strictly speaking, a version of modal realism, although it is a very close
variant of modal realism that modal realists should find appealing, and it is a view
that is in no respect inferior to a version of strict modal realism.
than one planet, it is surely contingent whether the pluriverse has more than
one L-world. Hence, it is highly plausible that, contra QR modal realism, it is
not necessary that there are multiple L-worlds.
More generally, QR modal realists claim that the qualitative nature of the
pluriverse is necessarily fixed: that is, they hold that the pluriverse couldn’t
have been qualitatively any different from how it in fact is. Prima facie, how-
ever, this claim is no more plausible than the claim that our universe could not
have been qualitatively different from how it in fact is. Nor is it any more plau-
sible than the claim that the pluriverse couldn’t have been different from how it
in fact is in any respect at all, including in non-qualitative respects. Since these
latter claims are surely false, the former claim is surely false also.
QR modal realists therefore face what we might call the contingency objec-
tion: QR modal realism is surely false since it is incompatible with a number of
highly plausible modal propositions, such as those expressed by (10), (11) and
the more general proposition that how things qualitatively are is a contingent
matter.
10. ^¬∃xBx.
11. ^¬∃x∃y((x , y) ∧Wx ∧Wy).
There are three kinds of responses a QR modal realist might make to the
contingency objection. First, they might accept that when we evaluate the
propositions expressed by (10) and (11) our modal reasoning (at least initially)
results in the confident judgement that they are true. They might argue, how-
ever, that further reflection shows that this reasoning is defective and that we
have no good reason to think that (10) and (11) are true. Second, they might
accept that (10) and (11) have a high degree of plausibility, but claim that
this plausibility is outweighed by the advantage modal realism has in parsi-
mony over rival theories of possible worlds that allow for the truth of these
sentences.31 Finally, they might accept both that (10) and (11) are highly plau-
31 A proposition may be plausible, but fail to be overall plausible, or plausible all
things considered. A proposition is plausible if it is intrinsically plausible, or if it
is plausible given certain other propositions we have good reason to believe, or it
is plausible given certain perceptual, introspective or memory states we are in. A
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sible, and that parsimony considerations cannot outweigh this plausibility, but
claim that other considerations do outweigh it. I will consider each of these
responses in turn and argue that none of them are successful.
A QR modal realist who adopts the first kind of response to the contingency
objection endorses (12).
12. Our modal reasoning when applied to (10) and (11) is defective and does
not provide us with a good reason for thinking that (10) and (11) are true.
One way a QR modal realist might attempt to justify (12) is by claiming that
all our modal reasoning is defective, and that, as a result, none of our modal
reasoning provides any good reason for believing the results of that reasoning.
A problem with this attempt to justify (12) is that it would seem hard to justify
such a blanket rejection of our modal reasoning. This is especially so since
some of our modal reasoning, such as the modal reasoning that results in the
judgement that necessarily any triangle has three sides, would appear to be as
secure as any instance of our reasoning (whether it be modal or non-modal).
Unless a QR modal realist can provide a compelling reason to think that such
reasoning is in fact defective, this first attempt at justifying (12) should be
rejected.32
A second way a QR modal realist might attempt to justify (12) is by claim-
ing that the modal claims expressed by (10) and (11) only appear true as a
result of us confusing them with other claims that are true. For example, a QR
modal realist might claim that (10) only seems true because we confuse the
proposition that there might have been no blue swans (which is the proposi-
proposition p may be plausible without being overall plausible, since the consid-
erations in favour of p might be outweighed by the considerations against p. Since
plausibility is a notion of broadly epistemic probability, as opposed to physical prob-
ability, what is plausible needs to be relativised to a subject or an evidential state.
32 A QR modal realist might perhaps attempt to give such a reason by giving a de-
bunking argument against the reliability of our modal reasoning along the lines of
debunking arguments against our moral reasoning. Due to limitations of space, the
prospects of such an argument cannot be investigated here. QR modal realists who
embrace scepticism about all our modal beliefs also face similar problems to those
faced by eliminativists about modality discussed in section 4, such as being unable
to test the analyses they propose using the method of possible cases.
tion expressed by (10)) with the proposition that there might have been no blue
swans that are in α. If this is the case, then there is no reason to think that (10)
is true or has a high degree of plausibility, and hence we have no reason to
think that the credibility of QR modal realism is damaged by its rejection of
(10) and its endorsement of (3).
Let pB be the proposition that there might have been no blue swans, and let
p∗B be the proposition that there might have been no blue swans in α. pB appears
to be true even after sustained reflection, and even after the possibility that one
is confusing pB with p∗B is brought to one’s attention. Moreover, at least in my
case, when I reflect on whether I am confusing pB with p∗B when it seems to me
that pB is true, it introspectively seems to me that I am not so confusing them.
Given this is true for others who have carefully considered the matter, QR
modal realists who adopt the first response to the contingency objection need
to claim that pB only seems true to such people due to them confusing pB with
p∗B, despite it seeming to them that they aren’t making such an error. In order to
undermine the plausibility of a proposition that on careful reflection seems true,
however, it is not sufficient to merely claim (without providing any evidence
for that claim) that the proposition only seems true because we confuse it with
some other proposition that is true. After all, if this tactic were sufficient, it
could be used to undermine the plausibility of any proposition at all, which
would lead to radical scepticism. In order to undermine the claim that pB has a
high degree of plausibility, it is therefore not sufficient to simply claim (without
providing any evidence for that claim) that pB only appears true because we
confuse it with p∗B when considering whether it is true. There appears to be no
reason, however, to think that we confuse pB with p∗B when we evaluate pB.
Indeed, not only does there appear to be no reason to think that we confuse pB
with p∗B when we evaluate pB, there is reason to think that we don’t so confuse
these propositions. While we sometimes confuse propositions when we reason,
we are typically able to detect that we are doing this when the possibility that
we might be doing it is brought to our attention. Since this is not the case for
pB, at least for those who carefully evaluate pB in the way described above,
we have good reason to deny that pB only appears true because we confuse it
with p∗B. The same is true for the other modal claims that appear true but are
incompatible with QR modal realism.
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A QR modal realist might attempt to respond to this problem by appealing
to modal restrictivism. Modal restrictivism is the view that non-philosophers
(and philosophers when not doing ontology) typically tacitly restrict their do-
main of quantification to at most parts of α.33 According to modal restrictivism,
for example, a biologist uttering ‘There are no blue swans’ typically expresses
the proposition that there are no blue swans in α, rather than the proposition
that there are no blue swans at all. Similarly, according to modal restrictivism,
a biologist uttering ‘There might have been no swans’ typically expresses the
proposition that there might have been no swans in α, rather than the proposi-
tion that there might have been no swans at all. A QR modal realist who adopts
modal restrictivism might claim that the fact we confuse pB with p∗B when eval-
uating whether pB is true is introspectively inaccessible to us, and hence is not
something we can uncover by introspectively considering the possibility that
we are confusing pB with p∗B. They might then argue that there is good reason
to believe that we so confuse pB with p∗B because we often confuse proposi-
tions that are expressed by the same sentence in different contexts (as pB and
p∗B are, according to modal restrictivists), and that this error is introspectively
inaccessible to us because ‘There could have been no blue swans’ expresses
pB only in unusual and highly theoretical contexts.34
33 At least when talking of individuals.
34 While defending the QR response, Noonan claims that modal realists can diminish
the conflict between QR modal realism and common sense by claiming that “the
commonsense man” asserts the restricted claim that there might have been no snakes
in α when he utters ‘There might have been no snakes’ (Noonan 2014, pp. 857–8).
Noonan, however, rejects modal restrictivism, writing “[W]hen the man in the street
says that there are no talking donkeys he does not merely mean that there are none
locally, that is, none spatiotemporally related to him, he means that there are none
simpliciter, otherwise he should greet the modal realist’s contrary contention with
a yawn of indifference rather than an incredulous stare” (Noonan 2014, p. 855).
Noonan also appears to claim that the commonsense man asserts that there might
have been (unrestrictedly) talking donkeys when he utters ‘There might have been
talking donkeys’ (Noonan 2014, p. 857). Given this mix of views, it is not clear why
the commonsense man would talk restrictedly when uttering sentences like ‘There
might have been no snakes’ when he doesn’t talk so restrictedly when he utters
sentences like ‘There are no talking donkeys’ and ‘There might have been talking
donkeys’.
This argument that we confuse pB with p∗B is very weak, even if we grant
the highly controversial thesis of modal restrictivism.35 First, natural language
is full of context-dependent expressions, and we are typically highly skilled at
using such expressions without confusing the propositions they express in dif-
ferent contexts. The fact that ‘There might have been no blue swans’ is context-
dependent therefore provides no reason to think that we are making the above
kind of error. Secondly, we are ordinarily highly skilled at understanding and
reasoning with propositions we have not encountered before (such as the propo-
sition that Obama does not have four right knees), as well as understanding and
reasoning with propositions only expressed by sentences in highly theoretical
contexts (such as when engaging in pure mathematics). As a result, the fact that
it is unusual to encounter pB, and the fact that it is encountered only in highly
theoretical contexts (even if these are facts), provides no reason to think that
we confuse pB with p∗B. Thirdly, even though in rare cases we might confuse
propositions when considering the truth of a proposition that is only expressed
by a context-dependent expression in unusual and theoretical contexts, the fact
that the proposition is encountered only in such contexts provides no reason to
35 Korman 2008 has persuasively rebutted a number of arguments for endorsing ordi-
nary object restrictivism (where ordinary object restrictivism is the view that ordi-
nary folk restrict their quantification to rule out strange fusions such as the fusion
of a feather with the Eiffel Tower), and Korman’s rebuttals apply with equal force
to analogous arguments for modal restrictivism. Modal restrictivism receives some
support from the fact that we are often willing to utter a sentence like ‘There are
many monsters we used to fear as children that we no longer believe in’ in one con-
text, while also willing to utter ‘There are no monsters’ in a different context. This
data supports restrictivism since restrictivists can explain our willingness to utter
these sentences by claiming i) that the first sentence (in the relevant context) is used
to assert the proposition that there are monsters we used to fear as children that we
no longer believe in, ii) that the second sentence (in the relevant context) is used
to assert the proposition that there are no monsters in α, and iii) that these proposi-
tions are compatible with each other. As (Korman 2008, Fn. 10) points out, however,
this data does not provide decisive support for modal restrictivism, since there are
alternative explanations for the data that don’t require restrictivism. For example,
our uses of the two sentences might be held to be incompatible with each other, and
our willingness to assert them in different contexts might be explained in terms of
different philosophical considerations being salient to us in different contexts, where
these different philosophical considerations point towards incompatible conclusions.
There are also non-restrictivist accounts of what the two sentences express on their
relevant uses which render them compatible with each other.
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think that this confusion should be introspectively inaccessible to us. The fact
that pB is only expressed by a context-dependent expression in unusual and
theoretical contexts therefore provides no reason to think that we confuse pB
with p∗B in a way that is introspectively inaccessible to us. Modal restrictivism
therefore provides no support for the claim that pB only seems true because
we confuse it with p∗B.
36 In light of this fact, this second attempt to justify (12)
appears to be as unsuccessful as the first. Unless a better justification of (12)
can be found, the first kind of response to the contingency objection therefore
appears to be unsuccessful.
The second kind of response to the contingency objection accepts that
modal claims like those expressed by (10) and (11) have a high degree of plau-
sibility, but argues that, despite this plausibility, QR modal realists are still
justified in rejecting them on parsimony grounds. QR modal realism is plausi-
bly more ideologically parsimonious than the best abstractionist theories, since
the best completions of abstractionism contain at least one fundamental notion
the best completions of QR modal realism do not contain: in particular, they in-
36 A QR modal realist might offer a variant of the first response to the contingency
objection which appeals to Lewis’s account of ‘actual’. According to Lewis’s ac-
count: i) as uttered by someone in an L-world w, ‘actual’ applies to an individual
x iff x is part of w, and ii) there is a non-rigid sense of ‘actual’ on which it is true
to say of what is actual that it might not have been actual, as well as a rigid sense
of ‘actual’ on which it is not true to say of what is actual that it might not have
been actual. (See [Lewis 1986, Sect. 1.9].) Instead of claiming that we confuse pB
with p∗B, a QR modal realist might claim that the reason why pB appears true is that
we confuse it with the true p#B, where p
#
B is the proposition that there might have
been no actual blue swans, where ‘actual’ is used in its non-rigid sense. Such a QR
modal realist might go on to claim that the reason we confuse pB with p#B is that,
even after reflection, we are unable to distinguish pB from p#B since we are unable
to distinguish the property of being (or perhaps the property of existing) from the
property of being actual. One problem with this response is that, if it is a fact that
we cannot distinguish the property of being actual from the property of being (or the
property of existing), then this fact provides reason to think that the reason why they
aren’t distinguishable is that they are identical (or at least necessarily equivalent),
which is incompatible with Lewis’s account of ‘actual’. Another problem with this
response is that we arguably can distinguish pB and p#B, at least in the sense that we
can refrain from endorsing ‘There might be no actual blue swans’ (at least for the
sake of argument), while reasoning perfectly competently with ‘There might be no
blue swans’. The fact that ‘There might be no blue swans’ still seems true when we
do this suggests that pB doesn’t seem true as a result of us confusing it with p#B.
clude at least one fundamental modal notion such as possibility. Granting that
QR modal realism is more parsimonious that its best abstractionist rivals in this
way, a QR modal realist might attempt to respond to the contingency objection
by claiming that this advantage in parsimony contributes more to the overall
theoretical virtue of QR modal realism than its incompatibility with plausible
modal claims, such as those expressed by (10) and (11), subtracts from it. If
this is the case, then QR modal realists can conclude that, despite its rejection
of (10) and (11), QR modal realism has greater overall theoretical virtue than
its abstractionist rivals, and is therefore more likely to be true than them.
Parsimony considerations are widely taken to be able to justify one the-
ory over another theory if the two theories are otherwise equally good. A QR
modal realist who adopts the second kind of response to the contingency objec-
tion, however, needs to go beyond this common view and claim that parsimony
considerations can justify QR modal realism over its abstractionist rivals, even
though there are important respects in which QR modal realism is worse than
its rivals. In particular, a QR modal realist needs to endorse (13), and it is diffi-
cult to see how (13) can be justified.
13. The theoretical virtue gained by QR modal realism having less fundamental
notions than its best abstractionist rivals outweighs the theoretical virtue
lost by it being incompatible with (10) and (11) and other similar plausible
modal statements.
One difficulty in justifying (13) is that any argument for (13) will be credi-
ble only if each of its premises is at least as plausible as the claims the argument
is being used to reject, such as those expressed by (10) and (11). In order to
provide a credible argument for (13), therefore, QR modal realists need to give
an argument whose premises are at least as plausible as (10) and (11), and
this appears difficult to do, given, as is admitted by the current response to
the contingency objection, (10) and (11) both have a high degree of plausibil-
ity. A second difficulty in justifying (13) is that a credible argument for it will
need to avoid making it too easy for an advantage in parsimony to outweigh
the plausibility of claims whose plausibility derives from considerations other
than parsimony, such as claims that are intrinsically plausible, claims that are
plausible given other propositions we have good reason to believe, and claims
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having an immediate justification based on perception, introspection or mem-
ory. The reason for this is that, if an argument for (13) makes it too easy for an
advantage in parsimony to outweigh such claims, then the argument risks hav-
ing the absurd consequence that the best theory relative to our evidence is the
maximally simple theory that holds that there is nothing. A third difficulty in
justifying (13) is that a priori inconsistent theories arguably cannot be parsimo-
nious, since such theories fail to coherently represent reality as being a certain
way, and hence fail to represent reality as being simple, as opposed to being
complicated. If a priori inconsistent theories cannot be parsimonious, however,
it is unclear whether QR modal realism has any advantage in parsimony that
can outweigh its incompatibility with (10) and (11), since its incompatibility
with these sentences will then be a reason to think that QR modal realism is not
a priori consistent and hence not parsimonious. Unless a QR modal realist can
devise an argument for (13) that overcomes these difficulties, the QR modal re-
alist’s claim that she is justified in rejecting (10) and (11) on parsimony grounds
will be unjustified.
It is useful to note that there are good reasons to think that parsimony con-
siderations can play a role in theory choice even when the competing theories
aren’t equally good in all other respects. Consider the following (idealised)
case involving an experiment testing a theory T1: Suppose that T1 and T2 are
incompatible theories whose disjunction is known (with certainty) to be true.
Suppose T1 and T2 are initially both compatible with the evidence, and that
the probability of T1 being true is 19/20 due to its great parsimony, while the
probability of T2 is 1/20. Suppose an experiment is carried out that measures a
quantity that has two possible values: Good and Bad. Suppose also that (due to
the possibility of human error) the probability that the result of the experiment
is accurate is 9/10 and the probability that the result of the experiment is inaccu-
rate is 1/10. Suppose also that whether the result of the experiment is accurate
or not is probabilistically independent of which value the measured quantity
has. Suppose further that T1 is incompatible with the measured quantity being
Bad, while T2 is incompatible with the measured quantity being Good. Finally,
suppose that the experiment gives the result that the quantity is Bad. Standard
probabilistic reasoning can then be used to show that, relative to our updated
evidence (which includes the result of this experiment), the probability of T1
will reduce from 19/20 to 19/28.37 Hence, after the result of the experiment is
known, T1 will still be more likely true than not true, despite the fact that its
only advantage over its rival is parsimony and (since it is incompatible with
the results of an experiment while its rival isn’t) there is an important respect
in which its rival is better than it. The existence of this case suggests that parsi-
mony considerations can do more than merely break ties in theory choice.
While the above case plausibly shows that parsimony can do more than
merely break ties between otherwise equally good theories, the case provides
little support for QR modal realists trying to overcome the contingency objec-
tion. The right course of action in the case of the experiment would be to check
to see if any mistakes were made in doing the experiment and, if necessary,
redo the experiment. If no mistakes come to light, and repeated experiments
come up with the same results, then we should reject T1, no matter how parsi-
monious T1 is.38 This suggests that in the modal reasoning case, if, on extended
reflection, no mistakes can be detected, and repeated deployments of our modal
reasoning give the same results, then these results should be accepted and QR
modal realism should be rejected.39
37 Before the result of the experiment is known, the probability that T1 is true and the
result of the experiment is inaccurate is 19/20 × 1/10, and the probability that T1
is false and the result of the experiment is accurate is 1/20 × 9/10. (Relative to the
original evidence, the truth of T1 and the accuracy of the experiment are probabilis-
tically independent since: i) the value of the measured quantity and the accuracy of
the experiment are probabilistically independent, and ii) the value of the measured
quantity necessitates the truth value of T1.) Hence, relative to the original evidence,
the probability of T1 being true, conditional on either T1 being true and the result of
the experiment being inaccurate or T1 being false and the result of the experiment
being accurate, is (19/20 × 1/10)/(19/20 × 1/10 + 1/20 × 9/10) = 19/28. After the
result of the experiment is known, since the result of the experiment is incompatible
with T1, it is known that either T1 is true and the result of the experiment is inaccu-
rate or T1 is false and the result of the experiment is accurate. Hence, after the result
of the experiment is known, the probability of T1 being true is 19/28.
38 I am assuming that all auxiliary theories relevant to the experiment are built into T1
itself so an error in the experiment will have to be due to human error.
39 Although it concerns abductive considerations that don’t uncontroversially reduce to
considerations of parsimony, the following mathematical case is another useful case
to consider: We arguably have strong inductive grounds for holding that Goldbach’s
conjecture is true, since it has been determined to hold of the many instances of it
that have been tested. If someone did a calculation which gave the result that Gold-
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The third way a QR modal realist might attempt to respond to the contin-
gency objection is to argue that, while (10) and (11) have a high degree of
plausibility, QR modal realists are free to reject them since they conflict with
other highly plausible claims. To illustrate this approach, I will discuss one ar-
gument of this type. I will argue that the argument fails and conclude that, in
the absence of any better argument of this type, this third type of response to
the contingency objection also fails.
In order to respond to the contingency objection, a QR modal realist might
claim that (14), (15) and (16) are each highly plausible.
14. (Faa ⊃ ∃xx((xx = aa) ∧ Fxx))). (Necessarily, if aas are F, then
there are some things that are aas and are F.)
15. (Blue swans exist or blue swans do not exist).
16. (If blue swans exist, then there are blue swans).
She might then point out that (17) is an instance of (14), and that (17) entails
(18), since, necessarily, if there are some things that are blue swans that do not
exist, then there are blue swans.
17. (If blue swans do not exist, then there are some things that are blue swans
and do not exist).
18. (If blue swans do not exist, then there are blue swans).
Since (15), (16) and (18) entail (3), she might then conclude that, despite its
plausibility, a QR modal realist is free to reject (10) since it is incompatible
with the at least equally plausible (14–16).
The problem with this argument is that the argument for the necessity of
blue swans it relies on over-generates: it cannot be sound, since, if it were
sound, then similar arguments with clearly false conclusions would also be
sound. For example, if this argument for the necessity of blue swans were
bach’s conjecture fails to hold for a certain previously untested instance, it might
still be rational to hold that Goldbach’s conjecture is more likely true than false, due
to the possibility of error in doing the calculation. If repeated calculations give the
same result, however, it would then become rational to reject Goldbach’s conjecture.
sound, then the following argument (whose premises are analogues of (15),
(16) and (17)) for the necessity of visible monsters under my bed would also
be sound:
(Either visible monsters under my bed exist or visible monsters under my
bed do not exist)
(If visible monsters under my bed exist, then there are visible monsters
under my bed)
(If visible monsters under my bed do not exist, then there are some things
that are visible monsters under my bed and do not exist)
——————————————————————–
(There are visible monsters under my bed)
Since this argument for the necessity of visible monsters under my bed is not
sound (since there are no visible monsters under my bed), the above argument
for the necessity of blue swans is not sound either.
A QR modal realist might attempt to respond to this objection by attempting
to give a motivated explanation for why the above argument for the necessity of
blue swans is sound when the very similar argument for the necessity of visible
monsters under my bed is not sound.40 In the absence of such an explanation,
however, the above argument for the necessity of blue swans must be regarded
with extreme suspicion and therefore cannot act as a counterbalance to the
plausibility of (10).41 Hence, without such an explanation, this last attempt to
40 The above argument for the necessity of blue swans is similar to arguments that
have been given for Meinongianism that also face over-generation objections, where
Meinongianism is the thesis that some things do not exist. (See, for example, Reicher
[2014], Parsons [1980], Zalta [1988] and Crane [2013].) Meinongians have offered
replies to these objections, but, as far as I know, these replies either have serious
problems or cannot be applied to defend the above argument (or both).
41 Given these arguments are unsound, why are they unsound? A plausible answer is
that, despite its initial plausibility, the instances of (PP) are false: the fact that visible
monsters under my bed don’t exist doesn’t entail that there are things that are visible
monsters under my bed that don’t exist, nor does the fact that blue swans don’t exist
entail that there are things that are blue swans that don’t exist. Another possible
answer is that sentences of the form ‘aas are F’ fail to express states of affairs when
there are no aas. If this is correct, then, if there are no blue swans, ‘Blue swans do
not exist’ fails to be true, since it fails to express a state of affairs.
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respond to the contingency objection also fails.
3. The ambiguity response
A modal realist might claim that (3) is ambiguous since ‘’ is ambiguous.
She might then claim that, while adequately responding to the puzzle forces
a modal realist to accept that there is a true reading of (3), this is not a problem,
since this reading is not the reading on which (3) is plausibly false. She might
also make a similar claim about (9).
3. ∃xBx.
9. ∃x∃y((x , y) ∧Wx ∧Wy).
One way a modal realist might develop this response is to claim that ‘^’ and
‘’ (and hence also ‘absolutely possibly’ and ‘absolutely necessarily’, which
they symbolise) are both ambiguous, with each having both an “ordinary” read-
ing and an “extraordinary” reading. A modal realist who adopts this response
might then claim that (^B ) and (B) are true when ‘^’ and ‘’ have their
ordinary readings, while (^eB) and (eB) are true when ‘^’ and ‘’ have their
extraordinary readings.42
^B. ^∃xBx =df ∃u∃x(Wu∧ Ixu∧ Bx).
B. ∃xBx =df ∀u(Wu ⊃ ∃x(Ixu∧ Bx)).
42 More generally, according to this response: i) (^) and () are both true when ‘^’
and ‘’ have their ordinary readings and φ is a non-modal statement expressing a
qualitative state of affairs, and where (as in footnote 20) ‘at u’ restricts all implicit
and explicit quantification within its scope to parts of (the referent of) ‘u’; and ii)
(^e) and (e) are true when ‘^’ and ‘’ have their extraordinary readings where φ
is any statement.
^. ^φ =df ∃u(Wu ∧ (at u, φ)).
. φ =df ∀u(Wu ⊃ (at u, φ)).
^e. ^φ =df ∃u(Wu ∧ φ).
e. φ =df ∀u(Wu ⊃ φ).
^eB. ^∃xBx =df ∃u(Wu∧ ∃xBx).
eB. ∃xBx =df ∀u(Wu ⊃ ∃xBx).
A modal realist who adopts this response might further claim that the ex-
traordinary readings of ‘^’ and ‘’ are the readings that ‘possibly’ and ‘nec-
essarily’ typically have in discussions of modal metaphysics when the peo-
ple involved in the discussion are explicitly considering the whole pluriverse,
whereas the ordinary readings of ‘^’ and ‘’ are the readings that ‘possibly’
and ‘necessarily’ typically have in other contexts (except when ‘possibly’ and
‘necessarily’ are being used to express an epistemic modality, or a relative non-
epistemic modality like physical possibility or technological possibility). For
example, such a modal realist might claim that the ordinary readings of ‘^’ and
‘’ are the readings of ‘possibly’ and ‘necessarily’ that are typically employed
in philosophical discussions outside modal metaphysics, such as in the debate
over whether philosophical zombies are possible and the debate over whether
free will is compatible with determinism. Call this response to the puzzle the
ambiguity response, call a modal realist who adopts this response an ambiguity
modal realist, and call the version of modal realism endorsed by an ambiguity
modal realist ambiguity modal realism.43
43 A modal realist might want to claim that ‘absolutely possibly’ and ‘absolutely nec-
essarily’ are context-dependent rather than ambiguous. Ambiguity modal realism is
essentially the version of modal realism Divers [2014] thinks a modal realist should
adopt. (Menzies & Pettit [1994] also seem to favour this version of modal realism.)
Divers’s preferred version of modal realism differs slightly from the version of ambi-
guity modal realism formulated above, since he holds that ‘^’ and ‘’ have a redun-
dancy analysis on their extraordinary reading on which p^φ =df φq and pφ =df φq
are both true for any statement φ.
Divers appears to suggest that modal realists should endorse an alternative version
of modal realism in Divers (1999; 2002), although he disowns this interpretation of
his previous work in Divers (2014). According to this alternative version of modal
realism: i) if ϕ expresses a state of affairs s that is not intrinsically about any L-
world (and so is a “trans-world state of affairs”), then p^ϕ =df ϕq and pϕ =df ϕq
are true; whereas ii) if ϕ expresses a state of affairs that is intrinsically about an L-
world (and hence is an “intra-world” state of affairs), then p^ϕq and pϕq are given
an analysis along the lines of the counterpart theory of Lewis (1968; 1971). This
version of modal realism faces the following problem: Suppose that ‘a’ refers to a
pyramid in α and is associated with a counterpart relation that relates the referent
of ‘a’ to a non-pyramid. Suppose that ‘b’ refers to something in a different L-world
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It is not immediately clear how the ambiguity response is meant to resolve
the puzzle, since the puzzle argument can be reformulated so that it poses the
following dilemma for ambiguity modal realists: Suppose in the current context
we ask an ambiguity modal realist what it is for it to be the case that ^∃xBx
and what it is for it to be the case that ∃xBx. Depending on what reading she
thinks ‘^’ and ‘’ have in the current context, she will answer this question by
either uttering (^B) and (B), or uttering (^eB) and (eB). If she utters (^B)
and (B), then we can once again give the original puzzle argument to establish
the conclusion that her answer is false, since it has the false consequence that
there is a blue swan in α. If, on the other hand, she utters (^eB) and (eB), we
can run the following version of the puzzle argument to show that her answer
commits her to the truth of ‘∃xBx’ in the current context:
1e. (^∃xBx ≡ ∃u∃x(Wu∧ Bx)) [^Be, -a]
2e. ∃u∃x(Wu∧ Bx) [1e, NPB, K]
3e. ∃xBx [2e, Nec]
We can then re-run the argument of section 2 to show that ‘∃xBx’, as used
in the current context, is false (or at least highly implausible). Hence, we can
conclude that, whichever answer an ambiguity modal realist gives, she answers
falsely (or at least implausibly).
Call this version of the puzzle argument the dilemma argument. In order to
respond to this argument, an ambiguity modal realist will presumably say, not
only that ‘^’ and ‘’ are ambiguous, but also that we easily confuse or equivo-
than a. Suppose also that ‘P’ symbolises ‘is a pyramid’ while ‘R’ symbolises ‘is
spatiotemporally related to’. Then, since ‘¬Pa’ expresses an intra-world state of
affairs while ‘Pa∧¬Rab’ expresses a trans-world state of affairs, this account entails
(D) and (E), where ‘Ca’ expresses the counterpart relation associated with ‘a’.
D. ^¬Pa =df ∃u∃x(Wu∧Caxa∧ Ixu∧¬Px).
E. (Pa∧¬Rab) =df Pa∧¬Rab.
Hence, on this account, ‘^¬Pa’ and ‘(Pa ∧ ¬Rab)’ are both true. Since these
statements are incompatible with each other, the account therefore fails.
cate over their readings, which makes the dilemma argument seem sound when
in fact it is not sound. Since the dilemma argument still seems sound after re-
flection and after we are made aware of the possibility that ‘^’ and ‘’ might
be ambiguous, however, an ambiguity modal realist would appear to also need
to claim that we aren’t introspectively able to distinguish when we are using
‘^’ and ‘’ (or ‘absolutely possibly’ and ‘absolutely necessarily’) with their
ordinary readings and when we are using them with their extraordinary read-
ings, and that this is why we easily confuse them and equivocate with respect
to them. Given we are introspectively blind to the different readings of ‘^’
and ‘’, and thus susceptible to confusing them and equivocating with respect
to them, an ambiguity modal realist can conclude that the dilemma argument
should not be taken as undermining or refuting the ambiguity response.
An ambiguity modal realist who adopts this response to the dilemma ar-
gument faces the following serious problem: The plausibility of an argument
cannot be rationally undermined by postulating an ambiguity there is no reason
for believing in other than it allows a defence of the view that is being attacked
by the argument. Such a manoeuver cannot work, since, if it could work, it
could be used to rationally undermine any argument whatsoever, which would
be absurd. An ambiguity modal realist therefore needs to provide an appropri-
ately independent justification for the ambiguity she postulates (as well as good
reasons to think that we are subject to equivocation or confusion with respect
to this ambiguity when judging the dilemma argument to be cogent). There
does not appear, however, to be any such justification. One standard piece of
evidence for a word being ambiguous, for example, is the existence of two
phonetically identical sentence tokens that plausibly differ in truth value, that
both contain the word, and whose difference in truth value can be explained by
the postulated ambiguity and cannot be uncontroversially explained in some
other manner. As far as I know, however, in the case of ‘^’ and ‘’ (as well
as in the case of ‘possibly’ and ‘necessarily’ where these are used to mean
‘absolutely possibly’ and ‘absolutely necessarily’) , there are no such sentence
tokens. Other tests for ambiguity, such as the conjunction reduction test, the
ellipsis test and the contradiction test, also appear unable to detect the postu-
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lated ambiguity.44 Unless ambiguity modal realists can provide appropriately
independent evidence for the ambiguity they postulate, then, the ambiguity re-
sponse should be rejected.45
An ambiguity modal realist might claim that the following argument pro-
vides the required appropriately independent justification for ‘^’ and ‘’ be-
ing ambiguous and having distinct ordinary and extraordinary readings:46 The
considerations in favour of modal realism (namely, its ability to increase ideo-
44 See (Sennet 2015, Sect. 4) for these tests. (Parsons 2012, Fn. 8) uses the conjunction
reduction test to test the kind of ambiguity postulated by the ambiguity response.
45 No linguist, as far as I know, has postulated an ambiguity along the lines postulated
by ambiguity modal realists, which provides further reason to think that there is no
justification for believing in the postulated ambiguity that is appropriately indepen-
dent of modal realism. The postulated ambiguity is also not supported by generic
accounts of possibility in terms of possible worlds, since standard abstractionist
accounts of possible worlds provide no reason to expect that ‘^’ and ‘’ are am-
biguous and have a reading on which ‘^φ’ and ‘φ’ are necessarily equivalent to
φ.
46 (Divers 2014, p. 869) might be taken as giving the following argument for the exis-
tence of the postulated ambiguity given modal realism: (1) (Absolutely necessarily
φ) =df (φ is true in all of modal space). (2) If modal realism is true, then modal space
is the plurality of L-worlds. Hence: (3) If modal realism is true, then (absolutely nec-
essarily φ) =df (φ is true in all the L-worlds). (4) ‘φ is true in all the L-worlds’ is
ambiguous since it can be understood as meaning ‘For each L-world w, φ is true in
w’, or it can be understood as meaning ‘φ is true in the mereological sum of all the
L-worlds’. Given modal realism, in the former sense ‘There is a blue swan’ is not
true in all L-worlds, while in the latter sense ‘There is a blue swan’ is true in all the
L-worlds. Hence: (5) Given modal realism, ‘absolutely necessarily’ is ambiguous.
(6) ‘Absolutely possibly’ is also ambiguous given modal realism by the same kind
of reasoning.
One problem with Divers’s argument (so interpreted) is that, even granting that ‘is
true in all the L-worlds’ is ambiguous, we have been given no reason to think that
‘is true in all of modal space’ is also ambiguous and has the same readings as ‘is
true in all possible worlds’. A second problem is that, even granting that ‘is true
in all modal space’ does have the same readings as ‘is true in all L-worlds’, we
have been given no reason to think ‘Absolutely necessarily φ’ is ambiguous and
has the same readings as ‘is true in all of modal space’. A third problem is that,
at best, the argument shows that ‘^’ and ‘’ are ambiguous if modal realism is
true. But this does not entail that the postulated ambiguity has a justification that
is appropriately independent of modal realism. For comparison, ‘^’ and ‘’ are
ambiguous if ambiguous modal realism is true, but this clearly does not entail that
the postulated ambiguity has a justification that is appropriately independent from
ambiguity realism.
logical parsimony and vindicate our best semantic, psychological and physical
theories) are also considerations in favour of the analyses of (19) and (20).
19. ^∃xBx =df for some L-world w, at w, there is a blue swan.
20. ∃xBx =df for any L-world w, at w, there is a blue swan.
The right-hand sides of (19) and (20) have multiple readings, since ‘at’ has
multiple readings. On one reading of ‘at’ (which may be called the restricting
reading of ‘at’), ‘at w, ϕ’ means ‘inside w, ϕ’, or ‘among the parts of w, ϕ’.
Given this reading of ‘at’, the right-hand side of (19) means ‘For some L-world
w, there is a blue swan that is part of w’ while the right-hand side of (20)
means ‘For any L-world w, there is a blue swan that is part of w’. On the other
reading of ‘at’ (which may be called the non-restricting reading of ‘at’), ‘at w,
ϕ’ roughly means ‘from the point of view of w, φ’, or ‘it would be true to say
that ϕ if one was in location w’. ‘At w, there is a blue swan’ is true on this
reading of ‘at’, iff, looking out on the pluriverse from the location of w, there
is a blue swan; which is true iff there is a blue swan. Hence, given ‘at’ has its
non-restricting reading, the right-hand side of (19) says that there is an L-world
such that there is a blue swan, while the right-hand side of (20) says that every
L-world is such that there is a blue swan. Since the right-hand sides of (19) and
(20) have two readings corresponding to the two different readings of ‘at’, the
left-hand sides of (19) and (20) also have two readings corresponding to two
different readings of ‘^’ and ‘’. Hence ‘^’ and ‘’ are both ambiguous, with
each having distinct ordinary and extraordinary readings.
An ambiguity modal realist who gives this response claims that the ambi-
guity she postulates isn’t only motivated by the need to defend modal realism
from the puzzle argument but is also independently justified by the considera-
tions that justify modal realism. In other words, she claims that parsimony and
explanatory considerations in favour of modal realism also support the exis-
tence of the postulated ambiguity, and that a modal realist would be justified
in believing in the postulated ambiguity even in the absence of the puzzle argu-
ment and the problems it raises. According to her, the postulated ambiguity in
‘^’ and ‘’ is therefore appropriately independently justified and a modal real-
ist can appeal to it in order to defend modal realism from the puzzle argument.
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In evaluating this claim, one might question whether ‘at’ is ambiguous in
the manner claimed above, or whether the parsimony considerations that sup-
port modal realism can justify the belief that an apparently conclusive argument
is unsound. Even granting that these questions can be answered in the manner
the above response requires, however, it is clear that the ambiguity postulated
by ambiguity modal realists is not appropriately independently justified by the
considerations supporting modal realism. This can be seen as follows: Define
univocal modal realism to be the same as ambiguity modal realism except that
it holds that ‘^’ and ‘’ (and ‘absolutely possibly’ and ‘absolutely necessar-
ily’) each have only one reading and that this one reading is the ordinary read-
ing.47 Univocal modal realism and ambiguity modal realism are equally ideo-
logically parsimonious and appear equally able to vindicate our best semantic,
psychological and physical theories.48 Hence the considerations that support
modal realism do not support modal realism over univocal modal realism, and
hence do not provide any reason by themselves for thinking that ‘^’ and ‘’ are
ambiguous, rather than univocal. Relatedly, given the right-hand sides of (19)
and (20) are ambiguous since ‘at’ has both a restricting and non-restricting
reading, the considerations in favour of modal realism do not support (21) over
(22).
21. Each of the left-hand sides of (19) and (20) has two readings, and, for each
reading of the right-hand sides of (19) and (20), there is a reading of the
left-hand sides of (19) and (20) on which (19) and (20) are both true.
22. Each of the left-hand sides of (19) and (20) has only one reading, and each
of the right-hand sides of (19) and (20) has only one reading on which (19)
and (20) are true.
47 Univocal modal realism endorses (^B) and (B) for this one reading of ‘^’ and ‘’,
and more generally () and (^), where φ is any non-modal statement expressing a
qualitative state of affairs. (See footnote 42.)
48 The theoretical work described in (Lewis 1986, Ch. 1), for example, can be done
by both univocal modal realism and ambiguity modal realism, and hence this work
provides no reason to prefer ambiguity modal realism over univocal modal realism. I
am ignoring the possibility that one or both of these theories are a priori inconsistent
and that a priori inconsistent theories don’t have a well-defined degree of ideological
parsimony.
Hence, in the absence of the puzzle argument, a modal realist would have no
reason to endorse ambiguity modal realism over univocal modal realism. The
justification for the ambiguity postulated by ambiguity modal realists is there-
fore not appropriately independent, and ambiguity modal realism is not justi-
fied.49
4. Worldly modal eliminativism
According to the final response to the puzzle I will discuss, a modal realist
should keep the non-modal ontology of modal realism but give up the letter
of modal realism by embracing eliminativism about modality, where elimina-
tivism about modality is the view that there are no modal aspects of reality.50 A
49 Lewis may be interpreted as endorsing a variant of the ambiguity response, which
we may call the sophisticated ambiguity response to distinguish it from the simple
ambiguity response discussed above. Lewis held that, if φ expresses a quantifica-
tional state of affairs, pat w, φq has multiple readings depending on whether ‘at w’ is
interpreted as restricting all the implicit and explicit quantification within its scope,
some of this quantification, or none of this quantification (Lewis 1986, pp. 5–6, p.
124). He therefore held that the right-hand sides of (P) and (N) have multiple read-
ings if φ expresses a quantificational state of affairs, even when φ has only a single
reading.
P. ^φ =df for some L-world w, at w, φ.
N. φ =df for any L-world w, at w, φ.
Lewis can be interpreted as holding that each of these interpretations corresponds
to an interpretation of the left-hand sides of (P) and (N) on which (P) and (N) are
true. On the account that results from this interpretation, ‘^∃xBx’ has two readings
(just as on the simple ambiguity response): one on which it expresses the state of
affairs that, for some L-world w, there is a blue swan that is part of w, and one on
which it expresses the state of affairs that, for some L-world w, there is a blue swan.
While a modal realist who adopts this account can give the same kind of response
to the puzzle as a modal realist who adopts the simple ambiguity response, this
response also shares its faults. In particular, there appears to be no appropriately
independent evidence that the sophisticated ambiguity thesis is true, and without
some such evidence the plausibility of the puzzle argument cannot be rationally
undermined by the claim that the sophisticated ambiguity account is true and that
we find the puzzle argument plausible only due to equivocating over or confusing
the readings postulated by the account.
50 This definition of eliminativism about modality is only rough, since nominalist theo-
ries can differ in whether they endorse eliminativism about modality. For discussions
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modal realist who adopts this response retains her belief in a vast multitude of
L-worlds generated by some version of the recombination principle. Instead of
analysing modal notions such as possibility and necessity in terms of this ontol-
ogy, however, she claims there are no modal notions, since modal expressions
are defective and fail to express anything. As a result, she avoids the puzzle
argument, since she endorses no reduction of modality and endorses none of
the premises of the puzzle argument that contain modal vocabulary. In place
of the rejected modal notions, such a modal realist puts forward replacement
notions defined in terms of her ontology of L-worlds, which, she claims, can
do all the important theoretical work the eliminated modal notions were meant
to do. For example, in place of the notions expressed by ‘possibly’ and ‘nec-
essarily’, which she rejects, she offers the notions expressed by ‘L-possibly’
and ‘L-necessarily’, which she might, for example, claim satisfy (23) and (24),
where φ is any non-modal statement not containing the introduced ‘L-possibly’
and ‘L-necessarily’.
23. L-possibly, φ =df ∃u(Wu ∧ (at u, φ)).
24. L-necessarily, φ =df ∀u(Wu ⊃ (at u, φ)).
Finally, a modal realist who adopts this response claims that the postulation of
multiple L-worlds given eliminativism about modality can do all the work they
are meant to do given modal realism, apart from that pertaining to modality,
which is no longer needed given eliminativism about modality. For example,
she claims that she can give the same analyses of propertyhood, causation and
mental content in terms of L-worlds that standard modal realists give.51 The
theory she adopts is also no less ideologically parsimonious than modal real-
ism with respect to modality, since, as the theory does not hold that there are
any modal notions, it does not hold that there are any fundamental modal no-
tions. As a result of this, this theory, which we may call multiple L-world elim-
inativism about possible worlds (or worldly modal eliminativism, for short)
appears to be just as ideologically parsimonious and explanatorily powerful
of eliminativism about modality, see Blackburn (1987) and (Forbes 1985, Ch. 9).
51 For such analyses, see Lewis (1973a) and (Lewis 1986, Ch. 1).
as modal realism. Call this response to the puzzle the worldly modal elimina-
tivist response, and call a modal realist who adopts it a worldly modal elimina-
tivist.52
According to worldly modal eliminativism, any sentence containing modal
vocabulary fails to express a state of affairs and hence fails to be true. Modal
realists who adopt this response must therefore, strictly speaking, reject modal
realism, since they cannot endorse (25), as it contains the modal expression
‘possible’.
25. There are multiple possible worlds.
The theory they endorse in place of modal realism, however, is very similar to
modal realism, and so adopting it might be highly attractive to modal realists
if it allows a successful response to the puzzle.
While worldly modal eliminativism appears to have a number of virtues,
it has two serious problems. One problem is that philosophers who embrace
it need to show that their ability to articulate and justify their belief in multi-
ple L-worlds isn’t undermined by their rejection of modal notions and modal
reasoning, and it is not clear whether they can do this. One difficulty such elim-
inativists face is formulating a sufficiently strong, precise and well-motivated
version of the recombination principle.53 While modal realists also face this
challenge, the need to provide such a recombination principle is greater for
worldly modal eliminativists, since, unlike modal realists, worldly modal elim-
52 A related response to the puzzle holds that, while it makes sense to make modal
claims about concrete things in α, it does not make sense to make modal claims
about concrete things not in α or to make modal claims that quantify over concrete
things not in α (as, for instance, (1) does). The problem with this response is that
such claims (like those expressed by ‘Had I gone swimming today there would (still)
have been multiple L-worlds’ and ‘There might have been multiple L-worlds’) seem
to make just as much as sense as modal claims about concrete objects that are part
of α. Moreover there seems to be no reason to think that such claims don’t make
sense apart from the desire to defend Lewis’s modal reduction from an argument
that seems to refute it.
53 The version of the recombination principle given by (RP) in section 1, for example,
needs to be modified so that: i) it no longer contains the modal expression ‘can’, ii)
it contains an account of what spacetimes there are, and iii) it contains an account of
what kind of pattern of instantiation through the plurality of L-worlds fundamental
relations have.
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inativists cannot employ modal notions to articulate their account of what kinds
of L-worlds there are, and hence are much more reliant on being able to formu-
late an adequate version of the recombination principle. The resources worldly
modal eliminativists are able to use to formulate and motivate such a prin-
ciple are also less than those of modal realists, since, while modal realists are
able to test different versions of the recombination principle by evaluating their
modal consequences when combined with their analysis of modality, worldly
modal eliminativists are unable to do this. Worldly modal eliminativists also
have fewer resources to motivate the analyses of non-modal notions they offer.
Modal realists can, for example, motivate their analysis of causation in terms
of L-worlds by arguing for an analysis of causation in terms of counterfactuals,
an analysis of counterfactuals in terms of possible worlds, and the analysis of
possible worlds as L-worlds, and show that the analysis of causation in terms
of L-worlds is a consequence of these individually well-motivated analyses.54
Modal realists can similarly motivate their analysis of mental content in terms
of L-worlds by arguing that it is a consequence of the analysis of possible
worlds as L-worlds and the attractive idea that contents distinguish between
possibilities that accord with them and those that do not. Worldly modal elim-
inativists, in contrast, cannot do either of these things, since they reject all of
these intermediary analyses due to their rejection of all modal notions. Finally,
worldly modal eliminativists are unable to use the method of possible cases
(which relies on (-a)) to test the analyses they put forward and are unable
to use counterfactual tests on the adequacy of the explanations they offer. The
ability of worldly modal eliminativists to test the analyses and explanations
they put forward as evidence of the virtues of their theory therefore appears to
be much diminished.
The second and arguably more serious problem with worldly modal elim-
inativism is its sheer implausibility. Worldly modal eliminativism has one im-
portant advantage over versions of modal realism, such as QR modal realism,
that don’t eliminate modality but do hold that some of our strong modal opin-
ions are false. The advantage is that worldly modal eliminativists do not have
to explain why some strong modal opinions — such as the opinion that there
54 This is what Lewis in effect does in (Lewis 1986, Ch. 1).
might have been no blue swans — are false, while other strong modal opin-
ions — such as the opinion that I might have gone swimming today — are
true and presumably justified. Worldly modal eliminativists do not have to face
this explanatory burden, since they think that all modal opinions are defective
and hence untrue.55 The advantage of avoiding this explanatory burden, how-
ever, is arguably more than made up for by the cost of rejecting the truth of all
modal sentences. Worldly modal eliminativists, for example, have to claim that
(26–28) all fail to be true.56
26. I could have gone swimming today.
27. There might have been no blue swans.
28. Necessarily, every triangle has three sides.
It is hard to accept, however, that each of these sentences is untrue. Indeed, it
is prima facie harder to believe that all such sentences fail to be true than it is
to believe that it is only sentences like (27) that fail to be true, which is what
QR modal realism, for example, is committed to.
It is important to note that, at least by itself, the increase in ideological
parsimony obtained by eliminating modality is not sufficient to justify its elim-
ination. If, on the contrary, it were sufficient to justify such an elimination,
parsimony considerations could presumably be used to justify the elimination
of every notion, which would be absurd. In order for a modal eliminativist
to justify eliminating modality, therefore, further reasons need to be given for
thinking that modal sentences fail to express states of affairs than merely those
concerning ideological parsimony. Moreover, since modal concepts, such as
55 Worldly modal eliminativists, however, still face the burden of needing to explain
why such opinions seem true and non-defective.
56 A variant of worldly modal eliminativism holds that it is only when used in the cur-
rent kind of philosophical context that modal vocabulary is defective and fails to
express anything. This variant needs to hold only that (26-28) are all untrue as used
in the current philosophical context. However, this seems little better than holding
that they are untrue in all contexts, since they all certainly seem true in the current
context and proponents of this variant view would need to explain why our more re-
flective modal judgements are defective while our less reflective modal judgements
are, on the whole, true.
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those of possibility and necessity, appear to be in good working order (or at
least they seem to be as much in good working order as pretty much any con-
cept we employ), such further reasons need to be very strong. As far as I know,
however, there are no such reasons.57
A worldly modal eliminativist might try to argue that modal concepts give
rise to paradoxes in the way the concept of truth arguably does, and argue that
this provides a good reason for thinking that modality should be eliminated.58
Given, as is widely believed, Quine’s arguments for the incoherence of modal-
ity fail, however, the prospects of such an argument do not seem strong.59
Alternatively, a worldly modal eliminativist might argue that the difficulty in
explaining how we know modal facts provides a reason to eliminate modality.
However, it is not obvious that the difficulty of explaining our modal knowl-
edge is any worse than the difficulty of explaining other types of knowledge
we have, such as our knowledge of the external world or our knowledge of the
future, so it would be rash to jump to eliminating modality on the basis of these
difficulties. While one cannot rule out a worldly modal eliminativist coming up
with strong reasons to think that modal concepts and expressions are defective
and fail to express any modal notions, the burden is on them to come up with
such reasons. Until they do so, we should reject worldly modal eliminativism.
5. Conclusion
I have argued that modal realists face a puzzle: while modal realists need to
give a reduction of modality in order for modal realism to be justified, a simple
argument appears to show that the reduction they give fails. I have considered
several responses a modal realist might give to this puzzle and have argued
that they each have serious problems and should be rejected. Given this is the
57 Some philosophers have held that ‘absolutely possibly’ and ‘absolutely necessarily’
are vague. (See, for example, Forbes (1985) and (Lewis 1986, Sect. 4).) If these
expressions are vague, and vagueness is a kind of defectiveness, then these modal
expressions are defective, but not in a way that supports worldly modal elimina-
tivism.
58 See Scharp (2007).
59 See (Quine 1960, pp. 195–200). For a critique of Quine’s arguments, see, for exam-
ple, (Melia 2003, Ch. 3).
case, and given modal realists cannot come up with better responses than those
considered here, modal realism should be rejected.60
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